It is a tough sell: sending 30,000 American countrymen and women into a ravaged country where poverty is near ubiquitous and bombings horrendously common. After weeks of difficult planning, President Obama faced a thorny challenge: convincing the American public his decision is right.

His strategy for this task was relatively simple: utilize his oratory skills at a renowned location- West Point– to win over American hearts and minds. But, just like Afghanistan, the move did not go as smoothly as anticipated. He has received flak from all directions, conservatives and liberals, military and civilian.

The following is a breakdown of his key selling points and an analysis of their motivation, problems and likely effectiveness.

“It’s easy to forget that when this war began, we were united- bound together by the fresh memory of a horrific attack, and by the determination to defend our homeland and the values we hold dear. I refuse to accept the notion that we cannot summon that unity again.”

While seemingly motivational, this concluding line smacks of politics. Obama’s commitment of fresh troops seems at least partially motivated by political aspirations.

Despite calls for bipartisan unity, the Obama administration has remained perennially praised by Democrats, and persistently denounced by Republicans. A move to gain Republican support has been needed since Obama’s inauguration, nearly a year ago. This move for military reinforcement could therefore be perceived as a political stroke.

Statistically speaking, 56 percent of polled Republicans announced support for Obama’s plan, a hearty improvement compared to the 10 percent Republican support for his sponsored health care bill.

It is very likely that the thought of winning over Republican opposition crossed through the president’s mind during his contemplation of strategy, but the move was undoubtedly primarily motivated by a genuine desire to achieve U.S. security interests.

“This review is now complete. And as commander in chief, I have determined that it is in our vital national interest to send an additional 30,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan.”

While 30,000 troops may be necessary to attain long-term stability in Afghanistan, this is not immediately necessary for American national security. Indeed, short-term American security does depend upon eliminating key Al-Qaeda members, but this is effectively achieved through concentrated strikes, uncorrelated with conventional forces and unrelated to the 30,000 troop increase.

The U.S. is faced with two objectives: short-term security through the targeted elimination of Al-Qaeda members, and long-term security through the stabilization of Afghanistan and preventing Al Qaeda from finding haven there.

The short-term goal is relatively easy to attain; unconventional strategies are already succeeding at eliminating important Al-Qaeda members.

The long term goal, however, is far more difficult to achieve. Long term stability is in effect a problem of state-building. Consequently, achieving this goal depends upon more than military support for Afghanistan; the U.S. will also need to foster significant international economic investment and good Afghan governance.

Unfortunately, in the current economic crisis, the United States and the rest of the world are unable to place a massive high-risk investment in the development of a failed state like Afghanistan. Additionally, little effort is being made to promote effective governance in Kabul that is responsive to the people. Hamid Karzai’s regime is horribly corrupt and will not bring about reform until leadership changes are made. Thus, U.S. long term interests regarding Afghanistan cannot be achieved unless military support is accompanied by foreign investment and serious pressure for governmental reform.

“Al Qaida’s base of operations was in Afghanistan, where they were harbored by the Taliban”

True, if emphasis is placed on the word “was”. Al-Qaeda was in Afghanistan; they now operate in much greater proportions in Pakistan and are virtually non-existent in Afghanistan. Thoroughly eliminating Al-Qaeda operational capability will require engagement with spawns elsewhere in the world including Yemen, Somalia, the Philippines, and most urgently, Pakistan.

But respect for Pakistani national sovereignty and lack of complete military cooperation has limited conventional U.S. military involvement within Pakistani borders. Therefore, the overwhelming majority of newly promised troops will soon be treading ineffectively in Afghanistan, not Pakistan.

Meanwhile the covert aspects of U.S. military and intelligence operations, which focus more singularly on eliminating Al-Qaeda rather than quelling tribal conflict or securing villages, will receive little assistance from the newly promised troop surge.

“In Pakistan, that nation’s Army has gone on its largest offensive in years.”

Unfortunately, conclusive success for the Pakistani military remains hazy at best. Although it has successfully shaken the metaphorical Al-Qaeda stronghold in western Pakistan through advances in Swat valley, Waziristan, and North West Frontier Province, these regions are far from completely stabilized and continue to provide a refuge to Al-Qaeda fighters.

Additionally, these advances have caused abundant Pakistani losses and displaced several hundred thousand civilians. Hope can be witnessed here, but a condition resembling civility remains a distant aspiration. Ultimately, even if Al-Qaeda is eliminated here, legitimate fears are growing about offshoot development in ungoverned regions elsewhere in the world.

“We will work with… the Afghan people to pursue a more effective civilian strategy, so that the government can take advantage of improved security. This effort must be based on performance. The days of providing a blank check are over.”

Good. But the purse strings are still far from taut, and genuine Pakistani governmental reform is unlikely to be brought about through petty reductions in spending. A completely reformed government is needed that responds more effectively to the tribal regions of the state and their respective leadership. Much Taliban opposition can easily be turned from their negativistic stance if properly represented in the central government.
During the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, many tribal leaders were witnessed changing teams based on non-ideological pragmatism, and would undoubtedly do the same today. It is the responsibility of the central government to approach and collaborate with this currently disparate tribal leadership, but due to the severe inadequacy of Karzai’s regime, United States diplomats should take a lead role in instigating and promoting cooperation.

“Afghanistan is not lost, but for several years it has moved backwards.”

This is an excellent point. Afghanistan could very well have followed trends to modernization witnessed in China or India decades ago. Preventing this advancement has been the state’s continuous disparity between rural agrarian regions and urban centers like Kabul. Long term stability will rely upon successfully integrating tribal leadership in rural regions with the central government in urban locales. The challenge presented here requires more aggressive U.S. diplomacy that peaceably engages the Taliban and ceases to unwaveringly support the Karzai regime.

“Because this is an international effort, I have asked that our commitment be joined by contributions from our allies.”

This is a paramount suggestion. Obama should tour Europe, Canada, and Australia flashing his infectious charm while illustrating the genuine international threat that Al Qaeda could produce if allowed to rebuild.  The 10,000 troop gap between Obama’s plan and the request by General McCrystal could be filled by international troops if adroitly requested by the president. If the popular support for troop commitment is nonexistent in a given coalition state, pressure should be applied to provide monetary support of Afghan operations to reduce the proportion shouldered by American tax dollars.

“We will seek a partnership with Afghanistan grounded in mutual respect.”

Is this déjà vu or does this sound familiar?  Obama made the same promises to the Arab community in Cairo six months ago stating “we [Americans] are willing to move forward without preconditions on the basis of mutual respect.”
Unfortunately this has not been followed through to the level of tenacity the statement implies. Obama has gone quiet on the Palestinian issue, bringing doubt to much of the Arab world about the sincerity of his promises from Cairo. Hopefully, Afghans will not suffer similar disappointment of his more recent promises from West Point.